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The undercutting of the European Social Dimension 
Chiara Saraceno 
 
We are witnessing a growing schizophrenic attitude and behaviour by the EU. On the one hand, it 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. On 
the other hand, through the economic stability pact, it compels the member states to reduce their 
budget, ignoring the plight of the poor, of the unemployed, of those needing social services that 
instead are being reduced, while also proposing to reduce the social cohesion and social funds (see 
the stalemate of 22-23 November 2012 on the budget) . 
 
I . F rom words to facts: the aims and the outcomes of the integrated and streamlined 
social O M C and reporting,  
 
A. The intentions were good, but the risks already visible and made explicit 
 
It is well known that the social dimension has never reached the same status as the economic one 
within the EU. Somewhat  paradoxically, this became even more evident with the introduction of a 
common currency in many member countries, which has neither been preceded nor followed by a 
political and fiscal union, nor by a European social compact. At the same time, there have been 
periods in the EU history when the importance of addressing in a common and coordinated way 
relevant social dimension has had an important acknowledgement. It was the case of  equal 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and early 2000s. In particular, the two summits held in the year 2000 (in Lisbon and Nice) marked a 
change in approach and the assumption of a more active role on the part of the Commission in the 
area of social ex/inclusion, albeit within the framework of the subsidiarity principle. The new 
orientations adopted at these summits were modelled on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 
which defines the roles of the Commission and of the Member States.1 The OMC puts 
??????????????? ???? ????????????? ????????????? ???? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???? ??????????
hands and confers the full accountability for the fight against poverty and exclusion on the member 
states. As in other areas, the OMC was based on three institutional instruments: 1) the establishment 
of a high-level committee (Social Protection Committee) made up of those who are responsible for 
                                                 
1 The Open Method of Coordination is a mode of governance developed under the European Employment Strategy at 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
convergence in areas (such as long-term unemployment, demographic ageing and social protection) that remain the 
responsibility of the national governments, but that concern the whole of the EU. 
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this area in the Council and in the respective governments; 2) the design of a Community Action 
Programme to combat social exclusion; 3) the creation and deployment of the National Action Plans 
for Inclusion (NAPs/inc) and their periodical revision by means of a Joint Report, and the 
application of a shared system of indicators conceived at the Laeken Summit in 2001 (under the 
Belgian presidency) for evaluation of the evolution of the situation, as well as progress and setbacks 
with regard to ????????????? ????? ???? ????? ????????????????????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ?????????
rather than enforcement. There are no penalties for not fulfilling the requirements, not even in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Daly 2006, Marlier 
et al. 2007), particularly compared not only to the EMU, but also to employment policies.  
 
While the OMC process in the area of social exclusion was slowly gaining some kind of visibility 
and legitimacy at least in individual member countries, and a debate was developing on the use of 
indicators and target setting, as well as on the opportunity and means to strengthen the impact of 
??????? ????????? ??????? ???? ????? ? ????????? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???????????
Following the 200???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and recommended that overriding priority be given to economic and employment growth policies, 
the 2005 Midterm Review of the Lisbon Agenda stressed that priorities should be refocused on 
employment and competition. It thus confirmed the secondary importance given to social policies, 
and particularly policies against poverty and social exclusion, in the European political agenda. Of 
course, one could argue ? as did the Kok Report ? that the reduction of poverty and social 
integration would be the natural consequence of more employment and a more competitive 
economy. But this argument is far from being empirically grounded, as shown above. In any case, 
following this reorientation of priorities, in the spring of 2005 a new approach was adopted ? the 
Revised Lisbon Strategy ? in which the weakest point of the triangle, social cohesion, was dropped 
and the focus was switched to the primacy of economic development and employment. Countries 
are now requested to prepare a National Action Plan for overall social protection and social 
inclusion. Social inclusion and policies to contrast poverty and social exclusion have become just a 
subsection of national plans where employment policies and pensions play the major role. Although 
??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the risk that the issue will be sidelined is very real, particularly in countries that have not taken the 
exercise seriously. 
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Actually, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) had been synchronized, with the policy 
cycle of the European Employment Strategy (EES) already in 2003,  in order to allow for synergies 
and coherent policies between the macro-economic and the employment coordination processes.  
In the same year, the European Commission had suggested the strengthening of the social 
dimension of the Lisbon Strategy via a streamlined social OMC Open Method of Coordination), 
which would synchronize different cycles (inclusion, pensions, health and long-term care) of the 
social OMCs, which up to then had been  governed by different rhythms, yet with similar reporting 
obligations. 
 
This proposal gained strength  in 2005, in the context of the revised Lisbon Strategy. In its renewed 
Social Agenda, the European Commission reiterated that it would propose that the OMC be 
?????????????? ???? ????????????? ???? ???????????????? ??????? ???????? ?????-cutting objectives for all 
three formerly separated strands and an integrated reporting cycle. The ensuing changes became 
??????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The ambition of the rationalisation processes were double (Frazer and Marlier 2008, Kröger 2011): 
??????? ???????????????????????????????? ???? ????????????????????????????cies to growth and jobs) and 
????????? ????? ?????????????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??????????
between the economic and employment processes on the one hand and the social processes on the 
other; second, there should be mutual interaction between the different strands (inclusion, pensions, 
health and long-term care) of the now streamlined social OMC. The streamlined process should 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
thr????? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
While national governments were generally in favour of streamlining, stakeholders were more 
ambivalent, in so far they saw the risk that the specific, in depth focuses and the involvement of 
stakeholders formerly developed in the separated processes be weakened in streamlining . This risk 
was particularly felt by stakeholders involved in the NAPs concerning poverty and social exclusion, 
which had a tradition of large involvement by civil society actors, compared to the pension and 
employment ones.  
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
?????????????????????????????????amline the fields of social inclusion, health and long-term 
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care and pensions in order to simplify reporting procedures, achieve more coherence across 
policies, encourage Member States to take a more strategic, cross-cutting approach and facilitate 
synergy effects with the streamlined Lisbon process. In 2006, the proposal was adopted by the 
European Council and the new streamlined process of the Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
OMC (SPSI OMC) thereby started. The specific objectives were and are: 
 Making a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion; 
 Providing adequate and sustainable pensions; 
 Ensuring accessible, high-quality and sustainable healthcare and long-term care; 
 
Besides the reporting system, there are common indicators and specific national indicators which 
should allow for the monitoring of the social situation in Member States and their (non-) 
achievements of adopted objectives. This was a new and positive development, since until then 
goals were vague as regard  their quantitative dimension and there were no agreed upon indicators 
for monitoring. In principle, quantifying goals could offer more leeway for critical peer reviewing 
of progress, as well as for national stakeholders to put pressure on their government towards the 
achievement of the declared and agreed objectives.   
 
B. But the implementation was weak  
 
Two years after the introduction of the streamlined SPSI OMC, the Commission issued a 
Communication in which it proposed to strengthen it further, indirectly suggesting  that the process 
was not yet delivering what was expected, particularly with regard to a systematic use of the 
common agreed indicators. More explicitly, an expert report in 2008 noted that the network of 
independent social inclusion experts recognised only limited and mostly implicit linkages and 
synergies between growth and jobs and social inclusion policies across the EU. EAPN (the 
??????????????????????????????? ? ??????? ???? ??????????? ???????????????????? ? ?????????????? ?????
streamlining has made it more, not less likely that the national activity is merely a report to the 
Commission - over such a big area and in such a new mechanism, the strategic task is not 
achievable. Nor is it evident that the status of the Joint Report on Social Protection and Social 
?????????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ????????????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ??????
afterwards (EAPN 2008) 
 
In order to respond to these concerns and to support greater interaction between the economic 
and social processes and objectives, from 2008 onwards, the SPSI OMC cycle was synchronised 
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with the Lisbon Strategy cycle. 
 
These adjustments notwithstanding, little evidence of a synergic approach is found in the national 
reports, and very generic in the SPC and Commission reports (Kröger 2011???????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
One reason for the missing interaction of the diverse policies and processes may be that there 
Has never been a profound analysis on how such mutual interaction could work and what it should 
look like to begin with. This cannot really surprise given the existing differences between Member 
States and between party families about the right way to social integration and the role the EU 
should play in it. The lack of clarification of and consensus on what streamlining could and should 
mean and how it could be achieved results in still another empty use, by the various actors,  of the 
?????????????????????? ????????????? ???????????????????? ????????? ? ???????????????? ????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? and on how it cab get lost, or 
totally transformed, in translation see for instance Barbier  2005). 
 
I I . The disappearance from focus of both poverty and non market social services  
 
?????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????????????? ???? ??? ????????? ???? ???? ????????? ????? ??????????? ????????
reforms and activation towards employment have taken up most, if not all, attention in the social 
OMC and Reports. In particular, as the crisis continued and austerity measures were put in place, 
with the number of the unemployed growing, the focus on activation towards employment was even 
more stressed, as if unemployment were the consequence of some individual failure to be corrected. 
At th?? ????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?he economy and, in some case, in the 
housing bubble. Paradoxically, the role of scapegoat was most prominent in those countries ? the 
Mediterranean ones ? where the welfare state was weaker, more fragmented and large quota of the 
population unprotected or only weakly protected (for instance, both Greece and Italy lack a 
minimum income provision for the poor). 
 
To be sure, this narrowing of focus has a longer history and precedes the economic crisis. The 
cultural shift of the eighties and nineties, strongly influenced by neo-liberalism, had  suggested that 
the old paradigm of the welfare state was inappropriate in a profoundly changed social, economic 
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and demographic environment. As it had been unable to combat long term unemployment, it should 
be replaced by a new paradigm stressing equality of opportunities and a strong emphasis on 
individual responsibility, although often framed within the social investment paradigm, with its 
corollary of the tension between active versus passive social policies. 
Also this neo-liberal paradigm, however, has proven to be ineffective. The strategy of focusing on 
access to employment at any cost has proven inefficient. Although empirical data do not offer clear 
and univocal evidence that the growing number of the working poor has resulted in increased 
poverty everywhere, it is true that most of the poor are working poor. Thus, being in employment is 
not the solution for them. It is true that  many working poor are not consumer poor, because they 
are not the main breadwinner in their household. It is the case of the young and of many women. 
???? ???? ??????????? ????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???????????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ???? ???????
options. 
 
Some observer (e.g. Cantillon and Vignon 2012) also point out that rebalancing the cost of social 
inclusion policies in favour of making  (paid) work attractive, risks making the lives of the core 
structurally unemployed even more difficult, in so far these policies do not touch the deeply rooted 
obstacles to work that render extremely difficult for some of the most vulnerable adults, including 
young people of working age, to participate in the labour market. Structural impediments to 
participation such as a health condition, limited access to child care, or a lack of proper housing 
close to job opportunities, are particularly worrying. Indeed, impediments such as these are the 
cause of the persistent  proportion of adults living in households where nobody works, or there is 
very little work little, even where the overall labour force participation rate has been increasing.  
Other vicious circles were driven by precarious unemployment. Coupled with short employment 
spells, precarious employment also entails fewer training opportunities, with a higher risk of being 
trapped in poor employment. 
 
Also ???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????????? ??? ????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ????????????? ????
???????????????? ?????? ? that of work-family conciliation policies and particularly of social care 
services (Mätzke and Ostner 2010)) -  with the tightening of national budget and the identification 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Not only the Barcelona targets with regard to child care coverage are far to be reached in many 
countries, particularly for the under three years old; there is also an increasing risk that, with 
???????? ?????? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ???? ??? ?????????? ????? ???? ???? ???? ??????????? ???? ??????????
dimension of these services prevails over the early education one, thus marginalizing the role of 
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social investment in children these services should have. The lack of effort by the EU (and the 
Social Protection Committee) to achieve standardized and comparable data on the quality and 
institutional status of child care services (Keck and Saraceno 2011) across the EU is certainly an 
indicator of  well known methodological difficulties. But it is also an indicator of a weak theoretical 
and political investment. A similar, if not worse, situation may be found in the area of social care 
services for the disabled and frail elderly. Once again, the countries where these services were less 
established are more vulnerable to cuts, while those were they have a longer tradition (and therefore 
more rooted constituencies), may experience some re-orientation in terms of quality and/or 
targeting. 
 
Problems with a too narrow focus on the employment strategy have been  recognized also by the 
SPC, in an opinion on the the post 2010 Lisbon strategy expressed in 2011: ???????????????????????
shown that considerable increases in employment rates observed in all EU countries coexisted 
alongside with significant numbers of workers in precarious jobs, working poor and jobless 
households. As concluded in the 2008 Joint SPSI Report, benefits of economic and employment 
growth have not always reached the most vulnerable and have not always led to increased social 
cohesion overall. Inequalities have often increased and limited progress has been achieved in the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Yet, apparently more out of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that coincide with active social protection policies can facilitate returning individuals to the labour 
market and minimizing b?????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? 
 
I I I . Still more contradictions to come 
 
The Europe 2020 strategy, approved by the EU Commission in March 2010, that is in the full 
middle of the financial crisis, seems to have reduced the social dimension to the contrast to poverty, 
although for the first time with a  specific, quantitative, target: a 25% reduction of the interested 
population. Towards this aim, it encourages countries to strengthen policies which support, once 
again, employability (investment in education and training, support to school-to work transition, 
social care services), but also forms of flexisecurity in order to support individual and family 
income over the life course. It is however unclear how the complex system of  levels of governance 
and actors set in place by this strategy in order to support and monitor the implementation of this 
objective may actually operate in a context where national budgets are under the control of  the 
BCE and of EU rules, particularly in the countries with higher public debt, but also higher levels of  
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poverty and unemployment (e.g. Saraceno 2011). The austerity measures imposed on Greece and, 
to a lesser degree, Spain, Portugal and Italy, certainly are neither conducive to lower unemployment 
and lower employment rates, as the Euripean Labour Surveys and Eu-Silc data testify. The 2012 
Report itself by the Commission on  Employment and social development, published on Januaary 8, 
2013, admits that the goals of Euope 2020 are becoming increasingly difficult to be achieved, both 
in the area of poverty reduction and of employment growth, and actually the situation has worsened, 
widening cross country differences with an emerging dualization between resilient and falling 
countries. The latter are precisely those which had a weaker and more fragmented welfare state that, 
under the crisis and under the requirements of the ECB and the Commission are expected to further 
reduce their social spending, rather than rendering it more efficient and equitable. 
 
The EU parliament has proposed (November 20, 2012) a Social Investment Pact as a compensation 
for the Euro-plus one. It asks for policies favourable to employment, including a systematic 
investment in education at all levels. The Commission has taken up this proposal, which should 
start be implemented in 2013. But with what money, if the EU budget is going to be reduced and 
many countries are forced to implement draconian austerity measures that in some country ? e.g. 
Greece and Italy ? have substantially reduced funding for education and research, thus for social 
investment in the young generations (as well as for innovation in the economic arena)? 
 
The Commission also proposes to create a European Fund to support the most deprived. We might 
interpret it as a kind of European minimum income guarantee, although, once again, linked to 
activation policies. This proposal seems to echo that of some observers, such as Cantillon and 
Vignon (2012), who argue that, in order to at least be coherent with the objectives of the Europe 
2020 strategy, the EU, which  now imposes a budgetary golden rule to be incorporated within each 
national constitution, should not stay neutral as to the consequences of such rules upon the structure 
of public spending. It should contain a safeguard clause with regard to the provision of a minimum 
income security and it should boost access to non market social services. 
The proposed budget for this measure, however, is well below the need estimated by the 
Commission itself: 2,5 billion over 7 years, compared to the estimated 4,75 billion. It is unlikely 
that the states that are most hit by the crisis and more constrained by the budgetary rules imposed by 
the EU are able to make up the difference. Even this limited provision, which evokes the image of a 
residual welfare state for the poor, therefore, is not likely to see the light.  Even less so since the 
November summit did not reach an agreement on the budget because many countries did not think 
that the budget cuts were enough. 
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